1			
1	STATE OF	STATE OF NEVADA	
2	LOCAL GOVERNMENT EN	IPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT	
3	RELATION	IS BOARD	
4			
5	CLARK COUNTY EDUCATION ) ASSOCIATION, )		
6	Complainant,		
7		CASE NO. A1-046025	
8	vs.       )         CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTICT,       )	ITEM: 764B	
9	)	ORDER	
10	Respondents,		
11	[}		
12	For Complainant: Clark County Education A Flaherty, Esq.	ssociation & their attorney Francis C.	
13		ict and their attorney S. Scott Greenberg, Esq.	
14	For Respondent. Clark County School Disu	tet and then attorney 5. Scott Greenberg, Esq.	
15	This matter came on before the Stat	e of Nevada, Local Government Employee-	
16	Management Relations Board ("Board"), for	consideration and decision pursuant to the	
17	provisions of the Local Government Employee	-Management Relations Act ("the Act"); NAC	
18	Chapter 288, NRS chapter 233B, and was prope	erly noticed pursuant to Nevada's open meeting	
19	laws.		
20	This Board had previously stayed this	matter pending the outcome of a grievance	
21	arbitration that Complainant Clark County Edu	ucation Association ("CCEA") had filed over	
22	Respondent Clark County School District's ("CC	SD") reduction of employee salaries by 1.125%	
23	in order to cover an increase in the contribution r	ate to the Public Employees Retirement System	
24	("PERS"). That arbitration proceeding has con	ncluded and CCSD has moved this Board to	
25	dismiss CCEA's prohibited labor practices compl	laint.	
26	This Board has exclusive jurisdiction over	r prohibited labor practice issues arising under	
27	NRS Chapter 288. City of Reno v. Reno Police P	rotective Ass'n, 118 Nev. 889, 895-897, 59 P.3d	
28	111		
	1		

1212, 1217-1218 (2002). The Board retains jurisdiction even when a related arbitration occurs. Id.

CCSD's motion asks the Board to dismiss this matter by deferring to the arbitrator's decision under the limited deferral doctrine. We grant in part and deny in part.

As recognized in <u>City of Reno</u>, the limited deferral doctrine is not a jurisdictional doctrine, but is a prudential doctrine reflecting a policy of favoring grievance arbitration as the preferred method of resolving disputes. <u>See also United Technologies Corp.</u>, 268 NLRB 557, 560 (1984). When countervailing policies outweigh the policy of preferring arbitration, the limited deferral doctrine will not apply. In this case, CCEA argues that the limited deferral doctrine should not be applied. We agree with CCEA.

Under <u>City of Reno</u>, the Board defers to an arbitrators decision if: "(1) the arbitration proceedings were fair and regular; (2) the parties agreed to be bound; (3) the decision was not "clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the [National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)];" (4) the contractual issue was factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue; and (5) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the [unfair labor practice]." <u>City of Reno</u> at 896, 59 P.3d at 1217.

CCEA has the burden to show that these elements are not met. <u>Id</u>. In opposing the motion to dismiss, CCEA has met its burden.

The contractual issue is not factually parallel to the prohibited labor practice issue. CCEA argues, and we agree, that the factual issue before the arbitrator was whether CCSD violated the 2010-2011 collective bargaining agreement by reducing employee salaries to account for the PERS rate increase. This necessarily focused on the content of the collective bargaining agreement. In this prohibited labor practice proceeding, the factual inquiry will focus on the course of action leading up to the salary reduction and whether or not CCSD refused to negotiate with CCEA over the PERS increase. As CCEA has alleged a refusal to bargain, the resolution of this complaint will depend upon whether or not the PERS increase is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and whether or not CCSD in fact refused to bargain over the change. These issues are  $\frac{1}{10}$ 

1

distinct from the question confronting the arbitrator of whether CCSD had breached a term of the collective bargaining agreement.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

Additionally, and more importantly, CCEA has met its burden to show that the arbitrator's decision is "clearly repugnant" to the purposes and policies of the Act. CCEA argues that NRS 286.421(3) allows for an option of how a PERS increase is to be funded and that the choice of how an employer funds a PERS increase is a mandatory subject of bargaining. CCEA reasons that if the election of how a PERS increase is funded is in fact a mandatory subject of bargaining, then deferring to the arbitrator's finding in favor of CCSD would allow a local government employer to refuse to bargain over a mandatory subject of bargaining. CCEA points to a statement in the arbitration decision that there was no such negotiation between the parties as to how the 2011 PERS contribution rate increase would be funded. This appears to be the basis upon which the arbitrator found that the PERS rate increase was not a part of the collective bargaining agreement.

The very heart of the Act is to allow local government employees to bargain, through their recognized bargaining agent, with their employer over the terms and conditions of their employment as set forth in NRS 288.150. If CCEA's complaint is well taken, then deferral to the arbitrator's decision at this stage would result in the Board's approval of a local government employer's refusal to bargain over a mandatory subject of bargaining. Such a result is clearly repugnant to the policies and purposes of the Act. e.g. <u>Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals Division</u>, 264 NLRB 1013, 1016 (1982), *enf'd*, 722 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1983).

In issuing this order, we note that the Board has not yet decided whether the selection of the options to fund a PERS rate increase is truly a mandatory subject of bargaining, and the parties will be allowed to present evidence and arguments on this issue should a hearing occur, but consistent with <u>City of Reno</u>, CCEA has shown that the limited deferral doctrine does not apply to this case. This implicates CCEA's First and Third causes of action, which will survive the motion to dismiss.

27 CCEA, in its opposition, states that it withdraws its second cause of action, therefore will
28 with grant the motion to dismiss with respect to CCEA's second cause of action only.

CCEA also requests the opportunity to submit updated prehearing statements. While we
will not mandate that any party submit an updated prehearing statement, we will allow any party
the option to do so. Any updated prehearing statement must be submitted within 20 days of the
date of this order.

We also note that this order does not constitute a decision to hold a hearing in this case, and this case will be placed on the agenda at a future board meeting to decide that question.

Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CCSD's motion to dismiss is granted as to CCEA's Second Cause of Action, and is denied as to CCEA's First and Third Causes of Action as set forth above;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party that desires to file an updated pre-hearing statement with the Board may do so within 20 days of the date of this order.

DATED this 3rd day of August, 2012.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS BOARD

BY: SEATON J. CURRAN, ESQ., Chairman

j		
1	STATE OF NEVADA	
2	LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT	
3	RELATIONS BOARD	
4		
5	CLARK COUNTY EDUCATION ) ASSOCIATION, )	
6	Complainant,	
7	) CASE NO. A1-046025	
8	CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTICT,	
9	Respondents, ) NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER	
10		
11	)	
12	To: Clark County Education Association & their attorney Francis C. Flaherty, Esq.	
13	To: Clark County School District and their attorney S. Scott Greenberg, Esq.	
14	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an ORDER was entered in the above-entitled matter on	
15	August 3, 2012.	
16	A copy of said order is attached hereto.	
17	DATED this 3rd day of August, 2012.	
18	LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE- MANAGEMENT RELATIONS BOARD	
19 20	1 111b	
20	BY JOYCE A. HOLTZ, Executive Assistant	
21	JOT CL M. HOLTZ, EXCOUTE MSSIBILIT	
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

	ηζι
1	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of the Local Government Employee-Management
3	Relations Board, and that on the 3rd day of August, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing
4	ORDER by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid to:
5	Francis C. Flaherty, Esq. Dyer, Lawrence, Penrose, Flaherty, Donaldson, & Prunty
6	2805 Mountain Street Carson City, NV 89703
7	S. Scott Greenberg, Esq.
8	Office of the General Counsel Clark County School District
9	5100 West Sahara Ave. Las Vegas, NV 89146
10	
11	1 - 11
12	there the the
13	JOYCE HOLTZ, Executive Assistant
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	2
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	