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STATE OF NEVADA

STATE OF NEVADA E.M.R.B.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS BOARD

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ELIZABETH JANE BANTZ

Complainant,

8 | v.

WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; BOARD OR TRUSTEES OF WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Respondents.

Case No. 2017-028
BEFORE PANEL C

ORDER

ITEM No. 832

On August 14, 2018, this matter came before Panel C of the State of Nevada, Local Government Employee-Management Relations Board ("Board") for consideration and decision pursuant to the provisions of the Local Government-Management Relations Act (the "Act"), NAC Chapter 288 and NRS Chapter 233B.

On April 10, 2018, Respondent Washoe County School District's (the "District") Motion to Dismiss the Complaint came before the Board. It appeared an evidentiary hearing was required in order to determine the issues presented including the proper submission and presentation of evidence as well as credibility determinations in accordance with NRS and NAC 288. The Board determined that a bifurcated hearing was clearly necessary (with the hearing on the applicability of equitable tolling occurring first) to lessen costs, expedite the matter, avoid prejudice, and in the furtherance of convenience. Neither party filed an objection to said bifurcation. The Board ordered that if it found that equitable tolling did not apply, then the matter would be dismissed pursuant to NRS 288.110(4). Having had said hearing, the Board finds that equitable tolling does not apply and as such the matter is dismissed.

DISCUSSION

Respondents argue that the matter is barred by the statute of limitations contained in NRS 288.110(4). We agree.

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Time limitations are not triggered until the victim receives unequivocal notice of a final decision. City of N. Las Vegas v. EMRB, 127 Nev. 631, 639, 261 P.3d 1071, 1076-77 (2011). Indeed, "equitable tolling 'focuses on 'whether there was excusable delay by the plaintiff: If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs." Id. at 640 (emphasis added); see generally Nevada State Bank v. Jamison Family Partnership, 106 Nev. 792, 800, 801 P.2d 1377, 1382 (1990) (stating that a "statute of limitation[s] will not commence to run until the aggrieved party knew, or reasonably should have known, of the facts giving rise to the breach"). "[T]he following factors, among any other relevant considerations, should be analyzed when determining whether equitable tolling will apply: [1] the claimant's diligence, [2] knowledge of the relevant facts, [3] reliance on misleading authoritative agency statements, [4] and/or misleading employer conduct, and any prejudice to the employer." See City of N. Las Vegas v. State, EMRB, 127 Nev. 631, 640, 261 P.3d 1071, 1077 (2011) (holding that equitable tolling will extend a statute of limitations if a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of their claim within the limitations period); Charles v. City of Henderson, No. 67125, 2016 WL 2757394, at *1 (Nev. May 10, 2016) (noting that "[t]he law does not permit equitable tolling when a party simply did not realize the 'extent' of his claim.")

The Board finds the factors cut against applying the doctrine of equitable tolling in this matter.

Bantz' claims for relief center around her application for ESIP which was denied on November 25, 2015. Bantz was informed on December 15, 2015, that there was not an appeal process for denial of ESIP. However, the District essentially agreed to take another look at her application, and the District informed Bantz on April 5, 2016, that it was denied for the same reasons it was initially denied back in November of 2015. As such, Bantz received unequivocal notice of the final decision on that date, April 5, 2016. However, Bantz waited until September 26, 2017, to file her initial complaint before the Board (almost 1 year and 6 months after (and roughly a year too late)). NRS 288.110(4) is clear and unambiguous that a complaint may not be filed more than 6 months after the occurrence which is the subject of the complaint. Bantz alleges that the District "improperly informed Bantz that no appeal process was available to her [and] relied on [the District's] representation" in this regard.

The claimant's diligence: Over a year passed and the evidence showed that Bantz was not diligent in filing her claim in this respect. Indeed, Bantz testified that she was actually familiar with this Board through her union related work. The claimant appeared to have been otherwise diligent in relation to her breach of contract claim. See infra n. 1.

Knowledge of the relevant facts: Bantz did not provide any new factual information pertaining

to her claims. Bantz admitted that there were no new relevant facts pertaining to her claims. See City of N. Las Vegas v. State, EMRB, 127 Nev, 631, 640, 261 P.3d 1071, 1077 (2011) (holding that equitable tolling will extend a statute of limitations if a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of their claim within the limitations period). As further detailed below, Bantz even testified that she was not misled by the email indicating there was no appeals process. However, when pressed by her attorney, she agreed that the email did not affirmatively state that she could go before the Board. This is not new factual information. Charles v. City of Henderson, No. 67125, 2016 WL 2757394, at *1 (Nev. May 10, 2016) (noting that "[t]he law does not permit equitable tolling when a party simply did not realize the 'extent' of his claim."); Campos v. Town of Pahrump, Case No. A1-046081, Item No. 785 (2013) (holding that a belated understanding of the existence of this Board is not a basis for equitable tolling); Danser v. The City of N. Las Vegas, Case No. 2017-035, Item No. 830 (2018) (finding that equitable tolling does not apply simply because complainant did not know to file a complaint with this Board, which was not new factual information pertaining to complainant's claims). Moreover, the evidence showed that the District never informed Bantz that she could not seek relief from the EMRB. Bantz testified that all of the facts giving rise to her claim surfaced by the subsequent April 2016 denial.

Reliance on misleading authoritative agency statements and/or misleading employer conduct: Bantz contends that the District's Human Resources staff informed Bantz that there is no ESIP appeal process. Even if true, the District did take another look at her application per her request (essentially providing her an appeal process), and there was no evidence that the District made any misleading statements to her. Ms. Interiano provided credible testimony that she was simply relaying information to Bantz that the administrative regulations which oversee ESIP, along with the CBA, do not provide for an appeal process (which appeared to be accurate based on the evidence presented). Moreover,

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Bantz responded that she was still going to appeal on the basis of language of the application, perhaps considering a class action, so there was no actual reliance. Furthermore, Bantz continually asserted that she believed the District simply breached the parties' contract, and the Board does not have jurisdiction over breach of contract claims, which is well-established. See also Order on Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. When pressed, Bantz asserted that what misled her was "[j]ust the constant meetings and emails when they kept stringing it along." Yet, this occurred prior to the subsequent April 2016 denial. Finally, Bantz actually testified (upon further examination) that she did not feel misled by Interiano's email informing her that there was no appeal process. As mentioned, while Bantz stated that the District did not tell her she could go before the Board, Bantz also testified that no one from the District ever told her she couldn't bring her claims to the Board. Further, Bantz testified that no one at the District told her she could not file a grievance or complaint pursuant to the parties' CBA.

<u>Prejudice to the employer</u>: The time span in this case is significant and testimony elicited at the hearing showed that the witnesses may not have a sufficient memory of the events that occurred due to the length of time that has passed in this case.

Finally, based on the facts in this case and the issues presented, the Board declines to award cost and fees in this matter.

FINDINGS OF FACT

- 1. Bantz' claims for relief center around her application for ESIP which was denied on November 25, 2015.
- 2. Bantz was informed on December 15, 2015, that there was not an appeal process for denial of ESIP.

¹ See NRS 288.110(2); City of Reno v. Reno Police Protective Ass'n, 98 Nev. 472, 474–75, 653 P.2d 156, 158 (1982); UMC Physicians Bargaining Unit v. Nevada Serv. Employees Union, 124 Nev. 84, 89-90, 178 P.3d 709, 713 (2008); City of Henderson v. Kilgore, 122 Nev. 331, 333, 131 P.3d 11, 12 (2006); Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 1908 v. County of Clark, Case No. A1-046120, Item No. 811 (2015); Simo v. City of Henderson, Case No. A1-04611, Item No. 796 (2014); see e.g., Flores v. Clark Cty., Case No. A1-045990, Item No. 737 (2010); Bonner v. City of N. Las Vegas, Case No. 2015-027 (2017).

- 3. The District essentially agreed to take another look at her application, and the District informed Bantz on April 5, 2016, that it was denied for the same reasons it was initially denied back in November of 2015.
 - 4. Bantz received unequivocal notice of the final decision on that date, April 5, 2016.
 - 5. Bantz waited until September 26, 2017, to file her initial complaint before the Board.
 - 6. Bantz was not diligent in filing here claim.
 - 7. Bantz was familiar with this Board through her union related work.
 - 8. Bantz did not provide any new factual information pertaining to her claims.
 - 9. Bantz admitted that there were no new relevant facts pertaining to her claims.
 - 10. Bantz was not misled by the email indicating there was no appeals process.
 - 11. The District never informed Bantz that she could not seek relief from the EMRB.
 - 12. All of the facts giving rise to her claim surfaced by the subsequent April 2016 denial.
- 13. District took another look at her application per her request (essentially providing her an appeal process), and there was no evidence that the District made any misleading statements to her.
- 14. Ms. Interiano provided credible testimony that she was simply relaying information to Bantz that the administrative regulations which oversee ESIP, along with the CBA, do not provide for an appeal process (which appeared to be accurate based on the evidence presented).
- 15. Bantz responded that she was still going to appeal on the basis of language of the application, perhaps considering a class action, so there was no actual reliance.
- 16. Bantz asserted that what misled her was "[j]ust the constant meetings and emails when they kept stringing it along."
 - 17. This occurred prior to the subsequent April 2016 denial.
- 18. Bantz did not feel misled by Interiano's email informing her that there was no appeal process.
- 19. Witnesses may not have a sufficient memory of the events that occurred due to the length of time that has passed in this case.
- 20. If any of the foregoing findings is more appropriately construed as a conclusion of law, it may be so construed.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- The Board is authorized to hear and determine complaints arising under the Local Government Employee-Management Relations Act.
- 2. The Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matters of the Complaint on file herein pursuant to the provisions of NRS Chapter 288.
- 3. NRS 288.110(4) is clear and unambiguous that a complaint may not be filed more than 6 months after the occurrence, which is the subject of the complaint.
- 4. Time limitations are not triggered until the victim receives unequivocal notice of a final decision.
- 5. Equitable tolling focuses on whether there was excusable delay by the plaintiff: If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs.
- 6. Statute of limitations will not commence to run until the aggrieved party knew, or reasonably should have known, of the facts giving rise to the breach.
- 7. "[T]he following factors, among any other relevant considerations, should be analyzed when determining whether equitable tolling will apply: the claimant's diligence, knowledge of the relevant facts, reliance on misleading authoritative agency statements and/or misleading employer conduct, and any prejudice to the employer."
- 8. The law does not permit equitable tolling when a party simply did not realize the extent of his claim.
- 9. If any of the foregoing conclusions is more appropriately construed as a finding of fact, it may be so construed.

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<u>ORDER</u>

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the matter is DISMISSED and equitable tolling does not apply in this case.

DATED this | day of September, 2018.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS BOARD

By: PHILIP LARSON, Presiding Officer

W D P D

By: GARY COLTINO, Board Member

CAM WALKER, Board Member